Books 1-5 Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle
The foundational text of Western moral Philosophy. The central question Aristotle is attempting to deliberate on: what is the human good, and how do we live so that we attain it?
Book 1
Aristotle sets up this quest with us by starting with the common ground: every activity aims at some good; therefore, there must be some highest good for human beings. He differs slightly from his teacher, Plato, in that, rather than deducing from first principles, he starts with the lives men lead and goes from there. He is asking why people pursue what they do; articulating what we must already know. Based on these lives, he offers 3: pleasure, honor, and wealth.
It seems that men not unreasonably take their notions of the good or happiness from the lives actually led, and the masses, who are the least refined, suppose it to be the pleasure, which is the reason they aim at nothing higher than the life of enjoyment
It is obvious that Aristotle is in the business of arguing that some of these are worth more than others. Aristotle rests a successful life, also a successful life lived, as eudaimonia. Rather than imagining this as happiness in the traditional sense (a state of being), you can imagine this as an action. It is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Interestingly, if I were simply virtuous by luck, then that would not fall into this category; my soul did not will it. Aristotle marks what is willed vs what happens to you by nature, often in this text. Weak reading of the text, but useful: apply this to life - action is the most virtuous thing you can do. Passivity is not to be longed for.
To reach what he aims for, he starts out by asking what we are for, what our function is. He notes that all things in nature have functions to reach a good, so surely we do as well. He also states that all of nature is distinctive and our rational ability is distinct to us. Rests this with the human good is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and there must exist one highest good we strive for. When your desires align with reason and deliberation, you're probably good to go.
Book 2
The virtues, then, come neither by nature nor against nature, but nature gives the capacity for acquiring them, and this is developed by training.
Aristotle's main argument here is the habitual nature of virtue.
We learn an act by doing that which we wish to do when we have learned it;... harping by harping; and so by doing just acts we become just, and by doing acts of temperance and courage we become temperate and courageous
Aristotle OG larper? Interestingly, he notes that you cannot be courageous or temperate by doing these things for ulterior motives. So one must deduce that you have to fake it until you make it.
Goodness is simple; ill takes any shape
Aristotle quotes the Pythagoreans here — there is one way to hit the mean and infinite ways to miss it
But in all cases, we must be especially on our guard against pleasant things, and against pleasure; for we can scarcely judge her impartially.
He argues that Virtue is a disposition to act in the mean between excess and deficiency, but makes a large point that this is relative to the person acting. This cannot be deduced in the same way mathematics can; only through reason. He notes that Virtue, again, only arrives through action. You can be taught, but one must act through habit at some point.
Book 3
This is where it became very interesting, and butt heads with ideas I am conflicted about. He focuses on the nature of action. Compulsion and ignorance, voluntary and involuntary. Aristotle seems to believe that ignorance and external compulsion move something to an involuntary status. I would argue with this, and he does too. All action has external compulsion, in my opinion. Of course, he brings in the mean as well. This is when something is done out of fear (telling during torture) or done out of a large reward. These are mixed actions, but aim towards voluntary. He argues for the ignorance of universal vs. the ignorance of particulars. IE did you know that the gun was loaded (Baldwin, I'm looking at you).
He then moves to the particular virtues: Courage and Temperance. An idealized and romanticized version of courage, which we would not interact with today.
Courage, therefore, brings pain, and is justly praised: for it is harder to endure what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant.
This is similar to what I mentioned earlier; you must act out of the sake of the noble without ignorance of your danger.
Temperance is specifically concerned with the pleasures of touch and taste. These are the things we share with the "beast" and the brutish.
You may, indeed, see other people taking delight in the smell of food when they are hungry; but only a profligate takes delight in such smells [constantly] as he alone is [constantly] lusting after such things
Book 4
Aristotle focuses on using the same mean-schema to specific virtues.
- Liberality (eleutheriotēs) — virtue concerning the giving and taking of money on a small scale
- Magnificence (megaloprepeia) — virtue concerning the giving and taking of money on a large scale
- Magnanimity (megalopsychia) — greatness of soul, the crown of the virtues
- Proper ambition — a nameless virtue concerning honor on a small scale (parallel to magnanimity at a small scale)
- Good temper (praotēs) — virtue concerning anger
- Friendliness — nameless virtue concerning social interaction
- Truthfulness — virtue concerning self-presentation
- Wit (eutrapelia) — virtue concerning amusement
- Shame — not a virtue proper but a passion appropriate to the young
On Liberality, Aristotle is concerned with prodigality and stinginess. Of course, somewhere in the middle is where one should sit.
Those who have inherited a fortune seem to be more liberal than those who have made one; for they have never known want, and all men are particularly fond of what themselves have made, as we see in parents and poets.
For the high-minded man never looks down upon others without justice, while most men do so for quite irrelevant reasons.
He is no gossip; he will neither talk about himself nor about others; for he cares not that men should praise him, nor that others should be blamed; and he is not apt to speak evil of others, not even of his enemies, except with the express purpose of giving offence
obsequious - those who please you praise everything and never object to anything, but think they ought always to avoid giving pain to those whom they meet.
But those who employ irony in moderation, and speak ironically in matters that are not too obvious and palpable, appear to be men of refinement
I found the magnanimous man, as described by Aristotle, to be a great figure to strive for. I understand the general push-back: "walks slow", "head up", "ironic when needed". While this is hard to look at on paper for some, I believe that it is what naturally arrives when one is confident and genuinely virtuous. Again, it is important to remember Aristotle is not drawing his ideal from first principles; he is attempting to look at how people live life now and draw from that outline. Will write more about this in a non-summary post.
Book 5
This is, in this 1-5, the most complex and politically applicable for me to read. This focuses on Justice. His argument here is a staged one, broad, particular, distributive, corrective, and how equity should work.
Justice, therefore, is essentially human.
Justice in the broad since is lawfulness, ideally the laws prescribe virtuous action. He identifies justice as relational to your neighbor and actionable, making it the complete Virtue. Particular justice is concerned with pleonexia - the desire to have more than a "fair" share. Distributive justice is a specific particular concerned with the distribution of goods; he argues goods should be distributed in proportion to merit (relational definition of merit here). The next particular is to do with transactions and wrongs. These are things that are done between two parties where if one is good and the other is not, or both good, it has no relation to the act. This is effectively what Capitalism brought out so well. Notably Voltaire arriving in London. This is also how the law works, looking at the situation itself rather than the individuals. Political justice, next, is kinda rough for the current time period.
Justice between master and slave and between father and child is not the same as absolute and political justice, but only analogous to them; for there is no injustice in the unqualified sense towards what is one's own, but a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one chooses to hurt himself.
Lastly, equity focuses on why legal systems can fall short.
What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct... when the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission.
Basically, universal law is by it's nature universal and general. The specific happenings of people are particular and unable to always fit the general concept.
Aristotle focuses heavily on if you can commit injustice against yourself. He believes no - injustice requires another party as you are doing what you believe to be best for yourself. The interesting case of this is of course suicide. Aristotle states that it is an injustice, but to the polis rather than himself.
He who through anger voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the right rule of life, and this the law does not allow; therefore he acts unjustly.
But towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. This is the same structure as Socrates' argument in the Crito. The laws constitute the framework within which justice claims have meaning, and the individual qua individual cannot be the locus of an injustice against himself.